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THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN. By Edmond Cahn. New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 194. $3.95.
AT a crucial point in his analysis, Edmond Cahn, echoing the words of the
prophet Ezekiel, characterizes the role of the watchman. "The watchman is the
citizen who decries an evil or a danger and does what he can to warn or ad-
monish his fellow citizens so that they may overcome the evil or avert the dan-
ger." In a democratic society, the watchman has a special function: he must
make the fullest rational use of every instance of demonstrated wrong and con-
crete injustice. Nothing could better epitomize the temper and method of Ed-
mond Cahn. He has a genius for focusing on the most shocking and brutal conse-
quences of "accepted" democratic legal procedures. Following in the prophetic
tradition, he implores us to see clearly what our predicament really is and to,
face it with intelligence, courage and hope. "The new predicament of democra-
tic man is his moral involvement in the misdeeds of government." If we are
to come to grips with this situation, we must first understand its background.
Three major "drives" are singled out by Mr. Cahn to describe the "back-
ground" of this moral involvement. The first is the drive to discard what
Cahn labels the "anthropomorphic notion of sovereignty." It is difficult to pin
down Cahn's exact meaning, for throughout his essay he prefers to illustrate
concretely what he intends rather than to define carefully his concepts. But the
anthropomorphic fallacy which has infected the writings of political philoso.
phers and is exploited by the demagogue is illustrated whenever we liken the
state to a human figure or primitive tribe. As long as we are victims of this
fallacy we will be unable to understand the moral dimensions of democratic
citizenship. Discarding crude anthropomorphism is the first step in becoming
politically mature and evolving a working philosophy for free men.
Once we have depersonalized the state and realize that it is "only an fin-
provised arrangement charged with the performance of certain social functions
and manned with certain more or less competent workers" who are basically
no different from the rest of us, then we are at the threshold of developing a
true democratic temper. Such a temper involves a "firm respect for oneself dis-
played as sort of a briny irreverence toward officials." This temper may be
expressed only negatively, but when it becomes constructive, it impels men to
look at government from a consumer perspective. Here we touch on the second
major drive that Mr. Cahn uses to set the stage for our new predicament. Cahn
sees the eventual triumph of democracy as the complete victory of the con-
sumer perspective over the old imperial or official perspective. From the con-
sumer perspective the fundamental issue is always how a particular institution,
act or law affects individual human lives, while from the outworn imperial
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perspective our main considerations are the order, dignity and tranquility of
the state. The choice of perspective makes a decisive practical difference, and
Cahn charges most lawyers, judges, politicians and businessmen with accepting
the imperial or official perspective.
Just as ridding ourselves of the anthropomorphic fallacy leads to the develop-
ment of a democratic temper which is expressed by the consumer perspective,
so the consumer perspective leads us to a proper understanding of the relation
between the Given and the Created. For if we are primarily concerned with the
uniqueness of each human being, his needs and rights, then we can properly
evaluate the role of historical events and documents-the Given. We must al-
ways respect the significant events and documents which are the very substance
of our tradition. But we must always understand and evaluate them from the
point of view of the present situation and the conceived future. One who has
adopted the consumer perspective realizes that the inherited given is the very
stuff out of which we create new concrete social values.
With this grasp of the background of our predicament, we can ask: What
are the responsibilities of the democratic citizen? Or more incisively: What is
the extent of our responsibility for the wrongful acts of officials? Our first
task is to dissipate the vagueness of vicarious responsibility. When we do this
we will know what precisely are our individual and collective responsibilities.
Once again, using the method of concrete illustration, Cahn eloquently pleads
that while we are not as electors automatically implicated in the guilt of of-
ficial misconduct, we do have a collective responsibility to foster the processes
of prevention, reparation, and protest. To the extent that we fail to encourage
these processes, we are failing to assume our minimum collective responsibility.
But we also have individual responsibilities and Cahn proposes a series of
questions I which each citizen ought to ask and honestly answer to test his
possible accessory guilt.
Having clarified the nature of our predicament and delimited the areas of
collective and individual responsibility, there is still another major issue to be
confronted: What are the incentives that make these responsibilities worth
bearing? Cahn's ultimate purpose is not to show that our new condition is
bearable but that it is uniquely desirable. The moral incentives, the basic ideals
of a democratic society, cluster about two fundamental ideas, equality and
quality. We can and must achieve not only equality of rights, but active equal-
ity where each man is actually treated and respected as a unique human being.
Equality is not enough. What our time needs is a clearer vision of the democra-
tic man as a man of quality--quality which is achieved through the virtues of
judgment, honor and associablity. The traditional watchman sees the problems
1. Did I incite the official to commit a wrong? Did I authorize the wrong? Was I
reckless in helping to install a conspicuously dangerous public instrument? Did I remain
silent or passive when I might have prevented a wrong about to be perpetrated? Did I
ratify the act of wrong or knowingly accept its fruits? Did I suppress the truth when
it came to my notice and thus become an accessory after the fact? Before the wrong was
committed, had I contributed to the vulnerability of the victim?
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of present and condemns existing evils, but he also has a vision of the possi-
bilities and hopes of the future. So Cahn concludes his essay on a triumphant
note, "I see a world where no nation is accounted strong execpt in justice,
rich except in compassion, or secure except in freedom and peace."
No one can put down this book without being impressed with Cahn's acute
sense of injustice and his passionate committment to the workings and ideals of
democratic society. At a time when many are hesitant or cynical, Cahn speaks
with boldness. Nevertheless, the weaknesses of this study are intimately con-
nected with its virtues. Cahn is essentially a moralist, a man who speaks with
assurance about what is right and wrong, good and evil. Despite his insistence
on the democratic belief in the fallibility of human intelligence, there is an
absoluteness in his own pronouncements. The moralist cannot hesitate to
analyze, qualify, and explore philosophical complexities, for his compelling
force results from the direct simplicity in which he states basic issues. From
such a point of view careful analysis is only logic chopping. But, if we take
seriously Cahn's own description of the democratic temper, then it becomes our
obligation to demand the credentials and justification for any and all presup-
positions. It is here that I find Cahn's study seriously deficient. Cahn rarely
argues; he declares or pronounces. For example, he emphatically tells us what
is and what is not the domain of collective and individual responsibility,
and he effectively illustrates what he means, but there is no sustained attempt
to justify his claims. Before outlining his program for individual self-search, he
dogmatically insists that "the sole available recourse is a sincere internal search
predicated on the series of questions we are about to list." But why these
particular questions? Why is this the "sole recourse"? These do not even seem
to be problems for Cahn.
More seriously, Cahn does not bring his own presuppositions into the
open arena of searching criticism. The precise relations of political, moral, and
legal obligation, indeed, the very meanings of "moral," "responsibility," and
"guilt," have been intensively explored and debated in past as well as con-
temporary writings. It would be presumptuous to expect an exhaustive treat-
ment of these and related topics. But considering that Cahn's main thesis is
that the modern predicament of democratic man is a moral one, it is unfortu-
nate that he has very little to say about the nature and meaning of morality and
responsibility.
There is another feature of this work that I find disturbing. Reducing basic
issues to simple terms can have the advantages of power and clarity, but ap-
parent clarity and precision may turn out to obscure and distort hidden com-
plexities. Too frequently Cahn is guilty of this charge; rhetoric is substituted
for cogent argument. We can illustrate this by returning to Cahn's discussion
of the background of our predicament.
When Cahn criticizes the anthropomorphic fallacy (it is never clear why
this is a fallacy), his main target is the vulgar type of "Uncle Sam" or "John
Bull" image. But he explicitly claims that the writings of political philosophers
are shot through with anthropomorphism and cites Aristotle's claim that the
good for a state is the same as the good for a man as evidence of his anthro-
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pomorphism. But there is absolutely no warrant for inferring from this claim
that Aristotle's view of the state is anthropomorphic. When we recall that
for Aristotle man is essentially a social animal, we realize that it is only in
the life of the community that we can fully achieve the good life. It is the state
or the political community which is the highest community and has as its pur-
pose, or telos, the realization of the highest good. The fact that Aristotle
thought of the political community primarily on the model of the Greek polis
does not mean that he is guilty of anthropomorphism. Furthermore, it is cer-
tainly misleading to say, as Cahn does, that for Aristotle state decisions are
evaluated "according to the same criteria" as individual decisions. If this
were true, Aristotle would never have needed to write a Politics in addition
to his Ethics. Perhaps it will be objected that this is only a pedantic cavil, so
let us grant for a moment Cahn's contention that the trouble with most older
views of the state results from their anthropomorphism. Nevertheless, the con-
clusion that he draws from this discussion simply does not follow. He claims
that once we discard crude anthropomorphism then "anyone can see that the
state is only an improvised arrangement charged with the performance of cer-
tain social functions.... ." This may be good rhetoric but it is poor logic. Cahn
writes as if the only alternative to anthropomorphism is the view of the state
he suggests. But there are other alternatives; we may think of the state as a
superstructure reflecting class interests or as function of the "power elite."
I am not suggesting that these are necessarily better ways of understanding
the state; my point is a logical one. Cahn does not seriously consider alterna-
tives, but seems to condemn them in one fell swoop by labeling them "anthro-
pomorphic."
I find the same type of distortion in the opposition between the "official"
and the "consumer" perspective. Cahn calls for due process and fair play, but
the very manner in which he characterizes this opposition prejudges the issue.
The official perspective is "imperial": it is "old," "outworn," "callous." I
certainly do not want to defend the official perspective (who would defend
this caricature?), but I do want to suggest that this way of stating the opposi-
tion obscures rather than clarifies basic issues. It is a mistake to polarize the
basic issue in American political thought as an opposition between those who
favor the dignity, order and tranquility of the state, and those who are
champions of the individual human being. The issue which emerges, and we
can see this already in the Constitutional Debates,- is the one of reconciling
authority and liberty, of deciding precisely the balance between the demands of
stability of government and flexibility in meeting individual needs is best for
the people.
One can just as easily caricature the so-called consumer perspective as one
which, although it nominally acknowledges the sacredness of inherited docu-
ments, nevertheless undermines the Given by allowing any interpretation of
2. Madison's Notes of D~bates in the Federal Convention, in THE FEER.A Co.NvM.-
TION AND THE FoP ATIox OF THE: UNION OF THE AumncAx STATES (Solberg ed. 1958).
See Solberg's discussion of reconciling liberty and authority. Id. at L'cxxix.
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it that is judged desirable for immediate purposes. Government is then no longer
really a government of law but a government of men. Both caricatures are dis-
tortions, and indicate the danger of extremes. The basic issue is not between
two opposed perspectives which in the language of the moralist are depicted
as the forces of light versus the forces of darkness. We must decide afresh
in each concrete instance precisely what is the right compromise between main-
taining past political and legal institutions, and adapting this fund of wisdom to
new urgencies and social values. This way of putting the issue undercuts any
simple opposition between an official and consumer perspective.
Though I have concentrated on a few main points, I believe that similar
criticism can be raised concerning most of the central theses in this book. My
purpose is not to belittle what Cahn has done, but to show how much more
must be done if we are to take seriously his own defense of the democratic tem-
per. Such a temper is most needed in the discussion of the fundamental issues of
democracy.
RICHARD J. BERNSTEINt
SOME NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW. By J. J. G. Syatauw. The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff,
1961. PP. xii, 240, Index.
WITH the emergence and participation of so many Asian-African countries,
international society has become, for the first time in history, a true world
society. Though most of these states are weak and underdeveloped, their
importance to the maintenance of public order in the present tension-ridden
bipolarized world can hardly be exaggerated. The process of authoritative de-
cision called international law, inherited by the contemporary world-wide com-
munity of states, of course owes its genesis and earlier growth to the interac-
tions among the nations of Western Europe during the last four centuries.
This process is, however, no "longer the almost exclusive preserve of the
peoples of European blood, 'by whose consent it exists and for the settlement of
whose differences it is applied or at least invoked.'"1 The demands of other
peoples must be taken into account.
What has been the attitude of these "new" oriental states towards this "sup-
posedly established international law" which, as we know, was developed
among the Western Christian countries during the period of their hegemony?
Do they accept the present law or do they follow a path which deviates from
the "established practice"? Do they reject it in toto, since they did not and
could not play any part in its development, or is their resentment merely
directed toward particular parts of the system which are reminiscent of a past
colonial age?
fAssistant Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.
1. 1 YEAnOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 158 (1957) (remarks of
first Vice-Chairman Pal of India).
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